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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
"\YILL J. McGO"\VAN, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
THE DENVER AND RIO GRANDE 
WESTERN RAILROAD COM-
pANY, a corporation, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
Case No. 
7683 
PRELIMINARY STATEMENT 
(All :figures in parentheses are the page numbers of 
the record. The parties will be referred to as they 
appeared in the lower court.) 
The plaintiff in this case based his right of recovery 
entirely upon the Safety Appliance Act relating to 
couplers, 45 U.S.C.A., Section 2. In so doing he elimin-
ated any defense of contributory negligence on his own 
part, 45 U.S.C.A., Section 53. 
The appeal here is by the defendant from a judg-
ment of $7,000.00, this being the amount to which the 
verdict of the jury was remitted by the court with the 
consent of the plaintiff. The original verdict was for 
$13,000.00. 
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STATEMENT OF F'ACTS 
The Statement of Facts contained in the appellant's 
brief is accurate except as to those matters which are of 
the most importance in this case. Throughout the entire 
brief the defendant continually seeks to draw unfavor-
able inferences against plaintiff from the testimony in-
troduced. We believe that a quotation from the record 
will disclose that the defendant has erroneously con-
strued the evidence given in this case with respect tq 
the following matters: (1) that the drawbar of the 
moving car was out of line sufficiently far that it was 
necessary to 1nove it in order to effect a coupling, and 
(2) that the plaintiff in fact moved the drawbar suffi-
ciently to permit the coupling of the cars. 
The coupling mo¥ement was made on the defend-
ant's tracks at Cameo, Colorado. The coupling was to 
be made on the Cameo siding. The engine had hold of a 
loaded coal car (36, 37) which had a seventy ton capa-
city (110). The coal car was attached to the rear end 
of the engine and the movement was to the east along 
this track for the purpose of effecting a coupling to a 
boxcar which was stationary on the Cameo siding track. 
Preparatory to making this coupling plaintiff placed 
himself eight feet west of the boxcar. He then observed 
the approaching engine and coai car. He was unable 
to make a judgment of the position of the drawbar until 
it was about eight feet from the stationary car (39). 
The testimony of the plaintiff contained in the record 
establishes that he did not equivocate about the position 
of the drawbar. He stated (39): 
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"Q. Now did you 1nake any observation of 
the coupling mechanisn1 on that 1noving car which 
required you to take smne action~ 
··A. Not until it got close enough to me. I 
could see it was out of line." 
Plaintiff definitely testified that in his opiniOn the 
drawbar \Yas so far out of line that it would not couple. 
He based this opinion upon his eight years of experience 
in participating in coupling operations. His testimony 
on this subject was as follows ( 40): 
"Q. As that was coming along there did 
you form an opinion as to whether or not, with 
the drawbar on that car in the position it was, 
whether or not there would be a coupling~ 
'·A. Yes, I did. 
'·Q. vVill you tell us your opinion, please~ 
"A. Well, it got up to where it was about 
eight feet from me. I could see the drawbar was 
far enough out of line that it wouldn't couple and 
that is when I started shoving it." 
Plaintiff put his foot on the drawbar and attempted 
to kick it over but even then it had not moved far enough 
to effect the coupling. He testified "I could see it still 
wasn't going to couple up so I shoved on it again" ( 40). 
On cross-examination plaintiff testified in regard to the 
draw bar as follows ( 63, 64) : 
"Q. Now when you say that draw bar was 
laterally out of position, in what way was it out 
of position-to the north or to the south~ 
"A. It was over too far this way-toward 
me. 
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"Q. Which would be toward the north 1 
"A. Had it not been I wouldn't have been 
shoving it over in order that it would couple on 
impact." 
He further testified on cross-examination ( 71) : 
"Q. Now how far would you say, Mr. Mc-
Gowan, the drawbar was off laterally to the north 
when you first saw it1 
"A. Well, it was far enough out of line it 
wouldn't have coupled on impact. If it had've 
I wouldn't have pushed on it with my foot. 
"Q. Can you tell me how far, in inches, or 
feet it was in direction off to your direction? 
"A. In inches I couldn't tell you. All I know 
is it was out of line." 
Plaintiff's testimony, as aforesaid, is unequivocal 
upon the proposition that the drawbar on the moving 
coal car was out of line to the north, or toward plaintiff, 
to such an extent that it would not have coupled without 
adjustment. Plaintiff was an experienced brakeman and 
was on the ground for the purpose of effecting the 
coupling of these two cars. The jury was entitled to 
give weight to his judgment on the position of the draw-
bar. Defendant's continual referring to this testimony 
as guesswork is neither fair nor does it reflect the fact 
nor does it give plaintiff the full benefit of this testimony. 
Throughout its brief defendant continually states 
that it could not be ascertained from the evidence 
whether or not plaintiff moved the drawbar by shoving 
against it with his foot. Plaintiff unequivocally testified 
on a number of occasions that there was movement 
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of the drawbar on each occasion that he shoved against 
it. He shoved three times with his right foot. On this 
subject piaintiff testified ( 41) : 
"Q. And did the drawbar or did the cars 
couple together~ 
"A. They did. 
"Q. And did you move the drawbar in order 
that they could~ 
"A. I did." 
On cross-exrunination he was asked in detail con-
cerning the movement of the drawbar accomplished by 
his pushing. He testified ( 66) : 
"Q. * * * Is it your opinion that it moved 
or didn't move on this first occasion~ 
"A. Well, I would say it moved a little." 
He then testified : · 
"Q. Well, when you found out it had only 
moved a little, then what did you do~ 
"A. Well, it continued on, the cars continued 
on into the impact and I saw it wasn't in line, it 
wasn't going to make it, so I kept putting my 
foot in there shoving on it. I think I shoved twice 
more on it." 
Concerning the second push or shove he testified 
(70): 
"Q. And on the second occasion when you 
pushed on it with your right foot, which was 
after you had given the stop signal which you 
say was ignored on that occasion, did the draw-
bar move with the pressure of your foot~ 
"A. It did. 
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"Q. And how far did it move on that second 
occasion when you pushed~ 
"A. Welt, I couldn't say approximately how 
far it moved, but I know it moved. Had it not 
moved the couplers wouldn't have coupled on the 
impact and have my foot in there. 
"Q. Just answer my question. On the second 
occasion you say when you pushed the drawbar 
did lllOVe~ 
"A. Yes." 
Regarding the third shove he testified ( 71) : 
"Q. Well now did the draw bar move over 
with the pressure of your foot on the third occa-
sion~ 
"A. It did, or it wouldn't have coupled up." 
He then was asked concerning all three pushes or 
shoves as follows (71): 
"Q. So on each occasion when you pushed 
on the drawbar with your foot the drawbar 
yielded and moved to some degree toward the 
center¥ 
"A. That's right." 
We submit that the foregoing testimony regarding 
the movement of the drawbar establishes that it was 
moved by the plaintiff sufficiently so that a coupling 
could be effected. 
Counsel in this F .E.L.A. case theorizes that as 
matter of fact that p'laintiff was in some way attempting 
to adjust the knuckles with his foot and not to align 
the drawbar (appellant's brief, page 13). This is abso-
lutely contrary to testimony of the plaintiff when he 
testified ( 73) : 
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"Q. And in this case there was no need to 
correct that situation as far as the knuckles were 
concerned~ 
•· A. As far as the knuckles were concerned, 
no." 
STATE:\IENT OF POINTS RELIED UPON 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A 
FINDING THAT THE COUPLERS DID NOT MEET THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF THE SAFETY APPLIANCE ACT 
RELATING TO COUPLERS. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR, EITHER PRE-
JUDICIAL OR OTHERWISE, IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY 
AS SET FORTH IN INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERED 3 AND 4. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR, PREJUDICIAL 
OR OTHERWISE, IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY AS SET 
FORTH IN INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERED 5 AND 7. 
POINT IY. 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR, PREJUDICIAL 
OR OTHERWISE, IN EXCLUDING THE PROFFERED EVI-
DENCE OF THE DEFENDANT THAT PLAINTIFF VIO-
LATED SAFETY RULES OF THE DEFENDANT COMPANY 
EITHER ON THE OCCASION HERE INVOLVED OR PREVI-
OUSLY. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE EVIDENCE WAS SUFFICIENT TO SUPPORT A 
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FINDING THAT THE COUPLERS DID NOT MEET THE 
REQUIREMENTS OF THE SAFETY APPLIANCE ACT 
RELATING TO COUPLERS. 
We are unable to understand the contention of 
defendant under its Point I. The purport of the point 
as stated in its brief would lead one to believe that 
its contention is that a directed verdict in favor of the 
defendant should have been granted. However, in its 
brief on page 7 the defendant states that it does not 
contend that the trial court erred in refusing to grant 
the defendant's motion for a directed verdict because 
of the absence of a mechanical defect in the couplers 
or because of a failure of proof of negligence on the 
part of the defendant in maintaining the coupiers in a 
good state of repair. If no such contention is made, 
then a directed verdict would not have been in order 
and the sufficiency of the evidence would become estab-
lished by admission of the defendant. 
Defendant does contend, however, that there is no 
evidence tending to prove that the cars involved were 
not equipped with couplers that would couple automatic-
ally on impact or that there was any necessity for 
plaintiff to go between the cars in order to effect the 
coupling on this occasion. Plaintiff's contention in the 
trial of this case was that the drawbar of the moving 
coal car was so far out of line that it was necessary 
for an adjustment to be made in order to effect the 
coupling and there was no device or attachment whereby 
the plaintiff could make the necessary adjustment with-
out going between the ends of the cars. Defendant's 
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own witness, Thomas McCoy, established that there was 
no attachment or device which could be used to accom-
plish a lateral adjustment of the drawbar and that it 
would be necessary for a brakeman to put some part of 
his body between the cars in order to accomplish the 
adjustment ( 110, 111) : 
"Q. Now there is nothing, if that coupler and 
the drawbar get off center, there is no mechanism 
there that you could stand outside from between 
the cars and adjust the draw bar, is there~ 
"A. No sir. 
:11: * * * * 
"Q. And he would have to step in between 
the cars, wouldn't he~ Isn't that right~ 
* * * * * 
"A. He would have to get a part of his body 
in there. 
"Q. In order to make that adjustment to that 
draw bar~ 
"A. Yes sir." 
It was also conceded by this witness that these draw-
bars because of wear and rust and other factors come 
out of line and remain out of line so that they cannot 
be coupled without some adjustment (111, 112): 
"Q. Now these various coupler mechanisms 
because of various differences in wear, a differ-
ent amount of rust, and other things of that kind, 
they vary, do they not in connection with the 
movement of the rocker, or the movement of the 
coup'ler drawbar itself? 
"A. Yes, they could. 
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"Q. And the ease with which they may be 
moved differs as among couplers 1 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. Some are hard to move and some are 
easier1 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. And some will stay over farther than an 
inch, will they not1 
"A. Some will, yes. 
"Q. And it depends upon the wear and the 
amount of rust or dirt that is in these working 
parts1 
"A. And the type of carrier arm would have 
a lot to do with it. 
"Q. And the type of carrier arm 1 
"A. Yes. 
"Q. And it isn't your testimony that these 
drawbars can't get far enough out of line so they 
won't couple 1 
"A. Well, I don't know about that. I saw 
them when they were coupled and we uncoupled 
them and coupled them back together and they 
coupled. 
"Q. W eU, you have seen cars that wouldn't 
couple when the drawbar was out of line, haven't 
you1 
"A. Yes sir. 
"Q. And that happens frequently1 
"A. Well, I wouldn't say with what fre-
quency. 
"Q. But you have seen it a number of times, 
isn't that right 1 
"A. Yes sir." 
One of the first cases construing the Safety Appli-
ance Act relating to couplers specifically held that Act 
placed an absolute duty upon the carrier to furnish cars 
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with coupling devices which could be coupled together 
without the necessity of n1en going between the cars for 
the purpose of coupling. That case was Johnson v. 
Southern Pacific Company, 196 U.S. 1, 25 S. Ct. 158, 162, 
the court there stated: 
"Tested by these principles, we think the view 
of the circuit court of appeals, which limits the 
2d section to merely providing automatic couplers, 
does not give due effect to the words 'coupling 
automatically by irnpact, and which can be un-
coupled without the necessity of men going be-
tween the cars,' and cannot be sustained. 
'"\Ye dismiss, as without merit, the suggestion 
which has been made, that the words 'without the 
necessity of men going between the ends of the 
cars,' which are the test of compliance with sec-
tion 2, apply only to the act of uncoupling. The 
phrase literally covers both coupling and un-
coupling; and if read, as it should be, with a 
comma after the word 'uncoupled,' this becomes 
entirely clear. Chicago, M. & St. P. R. Co. v. 
Voelker, 129 Fed. 522; United States v. Lacher, 
13± U.S. 624, 33 L. ed. 1080, 10 Sup. Ct. Rep. 625." 
The court also expressed the underlying reason for 
the passage of the Safety Appliance Act as follows, page 
161: 
"Nevertheless, the circuit court of appeals 
was of opinion that it would be an unwarrantable 
extension of the terms of the law to hold that 
where the couplers would couple automatically 
with couplers of their own kind, the couplers 
must so couple with couplers of different kinds. 
But we think that what the act plainly forbade 
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was the use of cars which could not be coupled 
together automatically by impact, by means of 
the couplers actually used on the cars to be 
coupled. The object was to protect the lives and 
limbs of railroad employees by rendering it un-
necessary for a man operating the couplers to go 
between the ends of the cars ; and that object 
would be defeated, not necessarily by the use of 
automatic couplers of different kinds, but if those 
different kinds would not automatically couple 
with each other. The point was that the railroad 
companies should be compelled, respectively, to 
adopt devices, whatever they were, which would 
act so far uniformly as to eliminate the danger 
consequent on men going between the cars." 
In recent decisions of the Supreme Court of the 
United States it has been held that the act is violated 
where the couplers do not or will not couple on impact 
without the necessity of men going between the cars. 
In O'Donnell v. Elgin, J. & E. Ry. Co., 338 U.S. 384, 70 
S. Ct. 200, 206, the Supreme Court related the historic 
deve'lopment of the law under the Safety Appliance Act 
and pointed out that courts did not readily accept the 
simple proposition contained in the Act. The court held 
the Act places an absolute duty upon the carrier to fur-
nish a coupler which will, under all conditions, auto-
matically couple by impact without the necessity of men 
going between the cars. Any time the coupler fails to 
so operate a violation of the Act has occurred and this 
regardless of any contention that too much was demanded 
of the coupler mechanism or by showing that the coupler 
had been properly manufactured, diligently inspected 
and showed no visible defects. The court stated: 
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"* • • These circumstances do go to the ques-
tion of negligence; but, even if a railroad should 
explain away its negligence, that is not enough to 
explain away its liability if it has violated the 
Act." 
The court in this case was discussing instructions 
and the final statement of the court adequately expresses 
its holding: 
"* * * As to the clai1n based on the Safety 
Appliance Act, we hold that the plaintiff was en-
titled to a peremptory instruction that to ·equip 
a car with a coupler which broke in the switching 
operation was a violation of the Act, which ren-
dered defendant liable for injuries proximately 
resulting therefrom, and that neither evidence -of 
negligence nor of diligence and care was to be 
considered on the question of this liability." 
One of the earlier Supreme Court cases is analogous 
to the present case. In San Antonio & Aransas Pass 
Railway Company v. Wagner, 241 U.S. 476, 36 S. Ct. 626, 
627, 60 L. Ed. 1110, a judgment in favor of plaintiff 
in an F.E.L.A. case was affirmed. The evidence tended 
to show that plaintiff was engaged in switching in de-
fendant's yard and was riding upon the footboard at 
the rear of an engine in order to make a coupling be-
tween it and a boxcar. The engine was backing. At the 
first impact the coupling did not make. Plaintiff then 
signaled the engineer to move forward and then gave 
him a backup signal. The plaintiff mounted the foot-
board of the engine. He looked down and saw that the 
drawhead on the engine had shifted over to the side. 
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He reached up with his left foot to shift the drawhead 
over so it would couple. His right foot slipped on the 
wet footboard and his left foot was caught between the 
drawheads and crushed. The trial court instructed the 
jury that if the locomotive and car in question were 
not equipped with couplers coupling automatically by im-
pact without the necessity of plaintiff going between the 
ends of the cars and by reason of this and as a proximate 
result of it plaintiff received his injuries, the verdict 
should be in his favor. The contentions made by the de-
fendant there are almost identical with those made by 
the defendant here. The court expressed them as follows: 
"* * * They set up that defendant was a com-
mon carrier engaged in interstate commerce, and 
invoked the provisions of the F·ederal safety ap-
pliance act * * *, averring that all couplers at-
tached to railroad engines, tenders, or cars must 
have sufficient lateral motion to permit trains to 
round the curves, and must be provided with ad-
justable knuckles which can be opened and closed, 
and such couplers must be adjusted at times in 
order that they may couple automatically by im-
pact, and that there is no kind of automatic 
coupler constructed or that can be constructed 
which will couple automatically at all times with-
out previous adjustment, because of the lateral 
play necessary to enable coupled cars to round 
curves; that the engine and car upon which plain-
tiff was employed at the time of his injury were 
engaged in interstate commerce, and were equip-
ped with automatic couplers which would couple 
automatically by impact as required by the acts 
of Congress, but an adjustment was necessary for 
this purpose, and could have been made by the 
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plaintiff going between the cars while they were 
standing, but without going between the ends of 
the cars while in n1otion, or between a Inoving en-
gine and cars, and without kicking the coupling 
or in any manner endangering his own personal 
safety; with n1ore to the same effect." 
The court in ruling for plaintiff stated in part as 
follows: 
"It is insisted that neither the original act 
nor the amendment precludes adjushnent of the 
coupler prior to or at the time of impact, or 
treats a drawbar out of alignment as a defect in 
the automatic coupler, or as evidence that the cars 
are not equipped with couplers measuring up to 
the statutory standard. The evidence of bad re-
pair in the automatic equipment was not confined 
to the fact that the drawbar on the engine was 
out of line; the fact that the coupling pin on the 
box car failed to drop as it should have done at 
the first impact, and required manipulation in 
preparation for the second impact, together with 
the fact that the drawbar on the engine was so 
far out of line as to require adjustment in pre-
paration for the second impact, and the opinion 
evidence, being sufficient to sustain a finding that 
the equipment was defective. The jury could 
reasonably find that the misalignment of the 
drawbar was greater than required to permit the 
rmtnding of cttrves, or, if not, that an adjusting 
lever should have been provided upon the engine 
as upon the car, and that there was none upon 
the engine." 
In Chicago, St. P., M. and 0. Ry. Co. v. Muldowney, 
130 F·. 2d 971, 975 (cert. den. 317 U.S. 700), a situation 
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was presented in which plaintiff's decedent apparently 
attempted to adjust a drawbar which was out of line. 
There were no eyewitnesses to the occurrence of the de-
cedent being caught between the couplers. In the switch-
ing operation involved a locomotive tender was to be 
coupled to a standing car. Decedent was standing on 
one of the steps on the rear of the tender. When the 
engine had reached a point about three car lengths from 
the standing car the engine power was shut off and it 
drifted gradually toward this car. A yardmaster stand-
ing near by, thinking it was about time for the engineer 
to slack ahead, turned around and observed decedent's 
lantern laying between the cars in the middle of the 
track. Decedent was between the coupler of the loco-
Inotive and the coupler of the standing car. The engine 
was moved ahead. Decedent was extricated and taken to 
the hospital where he died without recovering conscious-
ness. After his removal the crew attempted to proceed 
with the switching operation. The engine backed up to 
contact the coupler on the standing car but the coupling 
did not make. The drawbars on the switch engine and 
the standing car were out of alignment to such an extent 
that a coupling could not be made without an adjust-
ment of the drawbars. After the adjustment was made 
the cars coupled automatically. The court pointed out 
that it was the duty of decedent to see that the cars were 
properly coupled and if there was an adjustment to be 
made in the drawbars it was his duty to make it. An ex-
pert testified that the presence of a man's body between 
the two drawbars could not have forced them out of line. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
.. , 
.·· 
17 
The court held that by virtue of this testimony the jury 
could have found that the coupling would not have made 
because of the drawbars being out of line and that de-
cedent was performing his duties in attempting to make 
the adjustment at the time of his injury. The court in 
discussing the testimony stated as follows: 
"* * * It must be borne in mind that Mul-
downey at the time of the accident was enga:ged 
in an atten1pt to make this coupling. He was not, 
as suggested, proceeding to cross the track be-
tween the engine and the Swift car for the pur-
pose of going to the yard house. There is no evi-
dence that that was his purpose and to have done 
so would have been a desertion of his post in the 
midst of an important movement in which he was 
performing an essential part. His activities, we 
have a right to assume, centered around the suc-
cessful completion of his undertaking. If the 
drawbars were out of alignment to the extent that 
the coupling could not be made automatically on 
impact, that condition could only be cured by ad-
justing in some way these drawbars and that 
involved some movement of them. This could not 
be effected by the hand lever, and if the condi-
tion existed it was the duty of Muldowney not only 
to detect it but to remedy it. Assuming for the 
moment that this condition existed, the jury might 
well have concluded not only that he observed 
the condition but that he was in the act of attempt-
ing to remedy it. In doing so it was necessary for 
him to pass between the ends of the cars. If the 
assumed condition existed, the only. good faith 
effort he could have made to couple necessitated 
an adjustment of the drawbar. Any attempt to 
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1nake the coupling without such adjustment would 
be futile." 
In the Muldowney case it was necessary for the 
plaintiff to rely upon testimony that after the attempted 
coupling was made the drawbars were out of alignment 
to such an extent that a coupling could not be effected. 
In the case at bar the plaintiff was in a position where 
he could see and observe the position of the couplers and 
testified that the drawbar was sufficiently out of line on 
the coal car that a coupling could not be effected without 
adjustment of the drawbar. The position of plaintiff 
and the decedent in the Muldowney case were the same 
in that both were attempting to make an adjustment of 
the drawbar in order to effect a coupling. Plaintiff defi-
nitely testified in the case at bar that the drawbar was 
out of line and was moved sufficiently to permit the 
coupling to take place. We submit that this case is au-
thority for the proposition that where drawbars are out 
of alignment and it is necessary for the brakemen or 
switchmen to go between the cars to make the adjustment 
a violation of the Act has occurred and if it results in 
injury, the railroad company is liable under the Safety 
Appliance Act. Neither the Act nor the authorities re-
quire that an actual failure to couple is necessary to 
establish a violation. 
Defendant asserts there is no evidence that the 
rocker device failed to perform its function. Under the 
evidence this rocker device was supposed to cause the 
drawbar to come back into line so that the cars would 
couple on impact. The drawbar in this case was not in 
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such a position and hence the deviee had not functioned 
as it should. Concededly this could happen and adjust-
ment between the cars would then be necessary. 
In Atlantic City R. Co. v. Parker, 242 U.S. 56, 37 
S. Ct. 69, 61 L. Ed. 150, the drawbar was out of line and 
plaintiff put his arm between the cars to adjust. In 
holding for plaintiff the court stated: 
"If couplers failed to couple automatically 
upon a straight track, it at least may be said that 
a jury would be warranted in finding that a 
lateral play so great as to prevent coupling was 
not needed, and that, in the absence of any ex-
planation believed by them, the failure indicated 
that the railroad had not fully complied with the 
law-.'' 
The fact that the coupler functioned properly on 
other occasions is immaterial. Carter v. Atlanta & St. 
Andreu·s Bay Ry. Co., 338 U.S. 430, 70 S. Ct. 226. 
The case of Kansas City M. & 0. R. R. Co. v. Wood, 
262 S.\V. 520, cited by defendant, was decided in 1924 
and the consideration of evidence is not in accord \vith 
the modern day authorities on the interpretation of the 
F.E.L.A. and Safety Appliance Acts. That case is dis-
tinguishable on the facts because the plaintiff there only 
observed the coupler at the instance of impact and testi-
fied that on the impact "it took the drawbar away from 
my foot." The court characterized this by saying that 
it strongly indicated that plaintiff had not pushed the 
drawbar over prior to the time of impact. In the case 
at bar the testimony is definite that the drawbar was 
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moved by plaintiff. The defendant takes the position 
that the testimony of plaintiff must be entirely disre-
garded in this case. Under well-known principles in 
cases arising under the F.E.L.A., courts are not per-
mitted to disregard testimony. The factual questions 
must be submitted to a jury, which is the tribunal chosen 
by Congress to decide these questions of fact. See 
Lavender v. K urn, 327 U.S. 645, 66 S. Ct. 7 40, 90 L. Ed. 
196; Tennant v. Peoria & P. U. R. Co., 321 U.S. 29, 64 S. 
Ct. 409, 88 L. Ed. 520; Wilkerson v. McCarthy, 336 U.S. 
53, 69 S. Ct. 413, 93 L. Ed. 497. 
From the language of this Wood case the court 
apparently takes the view that it is necessary to show 
some "defect" but this is not the law. Carter v. Atlanta 
& St. Andrews Bay Ry. Co., 338 U.S. 430, 70 S. Ct. 226. 
We submit that the evidence in this case supports a 
verdict in favor of plaintiff under the law set forth in 
Instruction No. 3 and which correctly states the law of 
this case. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR, EITHER PRE-
JUDICIAL OR OTHERWISE, IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY 
AS SET FORTH IN INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERED 3 AND 4. 
Under Point II the defendant contends that the 
court's Instructions No. 3 and No. 4 are erroneous. No 
proper exception was taken to these instructions. RUle 51 
of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides in part: 
"* * * No party may assign as error the giv-
ing or the failure to give an instruction unless he 
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objects thereto. In objecting to the giving of an 
instruction, a party must state distinctly the mat-
ter to which he objects and the grounds of his 
objection." 
At R. 138 defendant excepted to Instruction No. 3 
generally, giving no grounds for its exception, and to 
the first paragraph thereof on the grounds there was 
no evidence that there was any necessity for plaintiff 
to go in front of the moving car to effect a coupling. 
This is not the reason it now criticizes this instruc-
tion. It contends in its brief, if we understand defendant, 
that defendant's liability is erroneously made to turn 
upon a theoretical function and conduct of plaintiff and 
that this instruction requires defendant to furnish a 
coupling device that needs no manpower to manipulate. 
The grounds set forth in the exception are ade-
quately answered by the testimony of plaintiff that the 
drawbar was so far out of line that it would not couple 
without an adjustment, and the testimony that there was 
no device or mechanism by the use of which a lateral ad-
justment could be made and it would be necessary for 
the workmen to go between the cars to make the adjust-
ment. 
Defendant's exceptions to Instruction No. 4 are 
found at R. 138 and 139. No ground of any kind is given 
as a basis for the exception. 
Defendant has not adequately raised the claimed 
error in these instructions and this Court should not, 
therefore, consider such assigned error on this appeal. 
On the merits of this assignment these instructions 
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correctly state the law and the language thereof cannot 
be strained to mean what defendant says it means. In-
struction No. 3 sets forth plaintiff's theory of the case, 
and No. 4 sets forth defendant's theory. By No. 3 the 
jury was told that to find for plaintiff it must be found 
by a preponderance of the evidence that the cars would 
not couple automatically by impact without the necessity 
of plaintiff going between the cars. In No. 4 the jury 
was told that if the couplers, even though out of align-
n1ent, would nevertheless have coupled automatically up-
on impact, then plaintiff's assistance was unnecessary 
and the verdict in such event should be for defendant. 
These instructions follow the language of 45 U.S.-
C.A., Section 2, and the construction placed thereon by 
the cases cited under Point 1 of this brief. 
These instructions do not say that defendant must 
furnish couplers which will couple without the necessity 
of any manpower. They merely require that the couplers 
couple automatically without the necessity of plaintiff 
going between the cars. Any manpower or manipulation 
exerted outside of a position between the cars is not 
prohibited. 
In Affolder v. New York C. & St. L. R. Co., 339 U.S. 
96, 70 S. Ct. 509, 94 L. Ed. 683, cited by defendant, one car 
was kicked against another and they failed to couple 
together. The court held that before there could be a 
finding that tlie cars had not properly coupled, a show-
ing should be made that the couplers were placed in a 
position to operate on impact. Placing them in position 
would have to be accomplished without the necessity of 
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going between the cars under the express language of the 
coupler act. The Affolder case does not involve such 
adjushnent. The case at bar does. Therein lies the dis-
tinction between the two cases. 
lVestern & Atlantic R. R. v. Gentle, 58 Ga. App. 282, 
198 S. E. :257, cited by defendant, is not in harmony with 
the late United States Supreme Court cases. It holds 
that it must be shown that failure to couple resulted 
from a defect. This is not now necessary. In the case at 
bar it was shown that the drawbar was out of line and 
no mechanism for adjustment without going between the 
cars. No such proof was present in the Gentle case. 
Defendant also cites Southern Ry. Co. v. Stewart, 
119 F. 2d 85, and Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co. v. Charlton, 
247 Fed. 34. Both of these cases involve a situation where 
coupling was not effected because the coupler knuckles 
were closed. However, the cars had a lever with which 
the knuckles could be opened without going between the 
cars and there was no showing that this lever had been 
used. The workmen went between the cars without any 
necessity. In the case at bar the jury could find the draw-
bar out of line and no mechanism to adjust without the 
necessity of going between the cars. 
We submit that defendant has not properly raised 
any error in these instructions by its failure to properly 
object and in any event the instructions correctly set 
forth the law and the basis upon which the jury could 
return a verdict for plaintiff or for defendant. 
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POINT III. 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR, PREJUDICIAL 
OR OTHERWISE, IN INSTRUCTING THE JURY AS SET 
FORTH IN INSTRUCTIONS NUMBERED 5 AND 7. 
Defendant has again failed to comply with Rule 51, 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, by its failure to state 
distinctly the matter to which it objects and the grounds 
of its objection to Instructions No. 5 and No. 7. At 
Record 139 it merely excepts to these instructions as a 
whole and particular parts of each without disclosing 
to the trial court its grounds. We submit that this 
claimed error is not properly raised and should not be 
considered on this appeal. 
Instruction No. 5 correctly states the law and the 
entire instruction must be read together. The first para-
graph defines "without the necessity of going between 
the cars." It means necessary for a workman to place 
son1e part of his body within the area between the cars. 
In that connection if it was necessary for plaintiff to 
adjust the draw bar or coupling mechanism with his hands 
or. feet there would be a violation of the Act. Read as 
a whole the only reasonable construction is that such 
use of hands or feet would have to be in the area between 
the cars to constitute a violation. The second paragraph 
refers to the first. We submit any other interpretation 
would be unreasonable. The liability Instruction No. 3 
clearly discloses the necessity of this requirement before 
plaintiff can recover. 
We agree that if a mechanism which worked was on 
the coupler or drawbar which would adjust the lateral 
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position of the drawbar without the necessity of men 
going between the cars there would be no violation. But 
here we have none. The rocker 1nechanism on the coupler 
here involved did not prevent the coupler from being out 
of line and no n1echanism was present for plaintiff to use. 
He had to align the drawbar with his hands and feet be-
tween the cars. It was conceded by defendant's expert 
that these rocker mechanisms sometimes, because of rust, 
dirt or other reasons, did not swing back into center 
position and that adjustments became necessary which 
required use of hands and feet within the forbidden 
area. 
Defendant under this point talks of devices to open 
knuckles and that the Act is satisfied if such devices 
can be manipulated outside the ends of the cars. This is 
true but there is no issue raised concerning knuckles or 
devices of such kind. Plaintiff contended that the draw-
bar was out of line and there was no device he could use 
outside the ends of the cars to make the adjustment. All 
the evidence related to this and no one involved in the 
case, jury, court or counsel, could have possibly believed 
that such evidence or the instructions concerned coupler 
knuckles or devices to open them. 
By Instruction No. 7 the jury was told that defend-
ant was not relieved from compliance with the Safety 
Appliance Act relating to couplers by reason of the fact 
that some lateral motion in the coupler mechanism was 
necessary. The defendant introduced evidence about the 
necessity of lateral motion in couplers in order that cars 
could make curves without derailing. The instruction 
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was required so that the jury would be able to properly 
evaluate this testimony and understand that merely be-
cause lateral motion was necessary still it was incumbent 
upon defendant to furnish couplers which could be 
coupled automatically by impact without the necessity 
of men going between the cars. 
Defendant does not claim that this instruction as 
so construed erroneously states the law. It concedes that 
the necessity of lateral motion does not relieve it from 
compliance with the Act. It rightly concedes that nothing 
relieves it from that duty but claims it was unnecessary 
to give the instruction. It was proper and applicable 
in this case because of the testimony introduced by de-
fendant on the subject of lateral motion of the drawbar. 
Defendant contends that this instruction informs the 
jury that lateral play is evidence of a violation. A read-
ing of the instruction establishes the fallacy of this as-
sertion. The instruction just does not say that. 
The case, Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Corp. v. Arring-
ton} 126 V a. 194, 101 S.E. 415, does not suppo·rt defend-
ant here. In that case plaintiff went between an engine 
and a car to adjust the knuckle and drawbar, the engine 
moved into him and he was injured. The court held that 
it was proper for plaintiff to testify, just as plaintiff 
did in the case at bar, that it was necessary for him to 
go between the cars to make the adjustment. The case 
was reversed because the damages were excessive and 
because the trial court refused to give defendant's re-
quest that side play in a drawbar according to standards 
in general and accepted use on railroads does not con-
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stitute a defect in the coupler unless the jury believed 
there was greater side play or the couplers were farther 
out of line than necessary for safe operation. Regard-
less of whether this request was in compliance with the 
Act the case does not hold that an instruction such as 
X o. 7 is erroneous. Defendant made no such request and 
assigns no error here based on a refusal of any of its 
requests. 
\Ye submit that defendant cannot prevail on its 
Point III because (1) the error, if any, was not properly 
preserved for review and (2) the instructions correctly 
state the law and are applicable to this case. 
POINT IV. 
THE COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR, PREJUDICIAL 
OR OTHERWISE, IN EXCLUDING THE PROFFERED EVI-
DENCE OF THE DEFENDANT THAT PLAINTIFF VIO-
LATED SAFETY RULES OF THE DEFENDANT COMPANY 
EITHER ON THE OCCASION HERE INVOLVED OR PREVI-
OUSLY. 
The plaintiff in this case contended that the defend-
ant violated the Safety Appliance Act relating to 
couplers in that it was necessary for him to go in between 
the ends of the cars in order to effect the coupling. The 
drawbar was out of line and no device or means was 
furnished by defendant so that an adjustment could be 
made without going between the ends of the cars. 
Defendant's contention under this point of its brief 
is one which if sustained would entirely eliminate this 
particular portion of the Safety Appliance Act. The situ-
ation as presented is simply that the ·congress of the 
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United States has said that it shall be a violation of the 
statute to have couplers which would not couple without 
the necessity of men going between the cars. The com-
pany promulgates a rule which is violated if the workman 
goes between the ends of the cars. By thus legislating 
the company can immediately discharge its statutory 
duty by the creation of a rule. Then, even though the 
statute is violated, under defendant's contention the rule 
of the company is also violated, and it would be left to 
the jury to determine which violation it thought more 
ser~ous. A moment's reflection on this subject should 
convince that certainly Congress did not intend any such 
result as this and the federal courts, including the Su-
preme Court, under their cases would not tolerate such 
a contention. 
The rules offered in evidence by defendant are rules 
prohibiting employees from going in between moving 
engines or cars to couple them, using their hands or feet 
to adjust drawbars and· stepping on a track between or 
in front of an engine or cars before the stop is made. 
A violation of these rules could be no more than contri-
butory negligence. The going between the ends of the 
cars by the plaintiff cannot be eliminated from this case 
nor can the necessity for his going between the ends of 
the cars in order to effect a coupling be eliminated. The 
testimony, as heretofore pointed out, supports a finding 
that the drawbar was out of line and there is no question 
but what in order to make an adjustment it was necessary 
for plaintiff to go in between the cars. We respectfully 
submit that. the violation of these rules in going between 
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the cars could never raise itself above the dignity of 
contributory negligence, which is expressly eliminated 
from consideration in these cases involving a violation 
of the Safety Appliance Act. 
\Y e submit that under the authorities proof of these 
rules and their violation was not admissible as a defense. 
The only question here involved was whether there had 
been a violation of the Safety Appliance Act and whether 
or not that violation contributed, in whole or in part, 
to cause damages to plaintiff. The matter of causation, 
if a violation exists, could not be eliminated by proof 
that the railroad told its employees not to go between 
the cars. 
A contention very similar to that now made by de-
fendant was made in the case of San Antonio & Aransas 
Pass R. Co. v. Wagner, 241 U.S. 476, 36 S. Ct. 626, 630, 
60 L. Ed. 1110. Plaintiff in that case sought to adjust 
the drawbar with his foot and it was caught between the 
coupler of the engine and the coupler of a car. The court 
stated: 
"In various forms plaintiff in error raises the 
contention that it was plaintiff's improper man-
agement of the coupling operation that was the 
proximate cause of his injury. But any miscon-
duct on his part was no more than contributory 
negligence, which, as already shown, is, by the 
employers' liability act, excluded from considera-
tion in a case such as this." 
Plaintiff in this case sought to bring his case only 
under the following provision of Section 53 of Title 45, 
U.S.C.A.: 
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"* * * Provided, That no such employee who 
may be injured or killed shall be held to have been 
guilty of contributory negligence in any case 
where the violation of such common carrier of any 
statute enacted for the safety of employees contri-
buted to the injury or death of such employee." 
By doing so plaintiff eliminated contributory negligence 
from the case. That this can be done was recognized by 
this Court in Ehalt v. McCarthy, 104 Utah 110, 138 P. 2d 
639, 641, where it was stated: 
"By planting his action on the above act, 
plaintiff was not embarrassed by any defense of 
contributory negligence which could have been 
raised if the action had been founded on sees. 51 
to 59 of 45 U.S.C.A., for the reason that the rail-
road is absolutely liable for injuries which are 
proximately caused by a failure to comply with 
the Boiler Inspection Act. Chicago, Burlington 
& Quincy R. Co. v. Willard, 220 U.S. 413, 31 S. 
Ct. 460, 55 L. Ed. 521, 61 L. Ed. 87 4; Baltimore 
& Ohio Railroad Co. v. Groeger, 266 U.S. 521, 45 
S. Ct. 169, 69 L. Ed. 419." 
There are many cases which have held that by claim-
ing only a violation of the Safety Appliance Act plaintiffs 
have effectively eliminated proof of contributory negli-
gence from the case. 
In Philadelphia & R. Ry. Co. v. Auchenbach, 16 F. 2d 
550, 551, the plaintiff had withdrawn all charges of negli-
gence against the defendant and relied entirely upon an 
alleged violation of the Safety Appliance Act. The evi-
dence disclosed that plaintiff opened the knuckle on the 
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coupler on the rear end of a car so that it would couple 
with a cut of three cars soon to be brought down from an-
other track. The couplers came together in solid impact 
but the pin of the drawhead of the approaching cars 
did not drop and the coupling failed. Plaintiff signaled. 
for the engineer to ease ahead and the cars moved a dis-
tance of one and one-half or two car lengths and stopped 
upon a signal from plaintiff. Plaintiff then went between 
the cars and attempted to manipulate the couplers by 
hand. The cut of cars attached to the engine moved back 
without warning and plaintiff's arm was caught between 
the two couplers. During the course of the trial the de-
fendant sought to introduce in evidence a rule which 
required a person going between cars at night to leave 
his lantern outside on the ground in the view of the other 
members of the switching crew. Plaintiff failed to com-
ply and defendant contended that this rule of violation 
constituted the proximate and sole cause of plaintiff's in-
juries. It was held that the trial court was correct in 
refusing to admit the rule in evidence. The court pointed 
out that the plaintiff was engaged in a coupling opera-
tion and there could be no question but that he came 
squarely within the class of employees to whom the law 
intended to assure protection. In discussing this propo-
sition the court stated: 
"* * * The defendant, however, to put the 
issue of proximate cause into the case, took the 
position, and still urges, that the Safety Appliance 
Act stopped and the protection it afforded the 
plaintiff ended when the couplers (because of a 
violation of the Act) failed to couple on the first 
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impact, and that the Safety Appliance Act being 
thus out of the case, the plaintiff himself was from 
that moment solely responsible for what happened 
as a result of his failure to observe the Company's 
rule to leave his lantern on the ground before go-
ing between the cars. Clearly the Safety Appli-
ance Act did not disappear from the case when 
its violation was first observed by the failure of 
the couplers to couple automatically by impact. 
When the couplers failed thus to couple, there 
arose the very danger against which the Act af-
fords protection, the evil against which its pro-
visions for safety appliances are directed. St. 
Louis & San Francisco R. R. Co. v. Conarty, 
supra; Chicago G. W. R. R. Co. v. Schendel, supra. 
The Safety Appliance Act 'was intended to pro-
vide against the risk of coupling and uncoupling 
and to obviate the necessity of men going between 
the ends of the cars.' Lang v. New York Central, 
R. R. Co., 255 U. S. 455, 41 S. Ct. 381, 65 L. Ed. 
729. When that necessity arises with its risk of 
personal injury, the intention of the Act is de-
feated and the law, if violated, extends to the 
consequences. The plaintiff in the instant case 
went between the cars to prepare for another at-
tempt to couple only because the couplers did not 
at first couple automatically by impact, that is, 
'Because the equipment of the car which it ·was 
necessary to (couple) did not meet the statutory 
requirements especially intended to protect him in 
his position.' Chicago G. W. R. R. Co. v. Schendel, 
supra; Tennessee A. & G.R.R.Co.v.Drake(C.C.A.) 
276 F. 393. If his act amounted to negligence it 
was no more than contributory negligence which 
was removed from consideration by the Act. Chi-
cago G. W. R. R. Co. v. Schendel, supra; Auchen-
bach v. P. & R. R. Co., supra. Moreover, it is the 
law that a violation of the Act need not be the sole 
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efficient cause in order that an action may lie. 
So also the element of proximate cause is elimi-
nated zchere concurrent acts of the employer and 
employee contribute to the injury. Spokane & 
Island E. R. Co. v. Campbell, 241 U.S. 497, 510, 
36 S. Ct. 683, 60 L. Ed. 1125; Pless v. New York 
Central R. R. Co., 189 App. Div. 261, 179 N.Y.S. 
578, affirmed, 232 N.Y. 523, 134 N.E. 555. In this 
situation, where there was nothing to show that 
the plaintiff's contributory negligence, if any, was 
other than negligence concurrent with that of the 
defendant, it follows that an issue of the plain-
tiff's contributory negligence with its underlying 
issue of proximate cause was eliminated from the 
case and, in consequence, evidence to prove it was 
properly rejected." 
In Leet v. Union Pacific R. Co., 60 Cal. App. 2d 814, 
142 P. 2d 37, 40, the court recognized that a railroad could 
not discharge its duties under the Safety Appliance Act 
by passage of rules. In that case plaintiff brought an 
action for wrongful death based upon a violation of the 
F'ederal Safety Appliance Act requiring all cars used 
in interstate commerce to be equipped with efficient hand 
brakes. The defendant sought to introduce a rule which 
was excluded by the trial court. After referring to Tiller 
v. Atlantic Coast Line Railroad Co., 318 U.S. 54, 63 S.. Ct. 
444, 87 L. Ed. 610, 143 A.L.R. 967, the court stated: 
"Since the negligence of the defendant in 
sending out a car with its brake rigging in a de-
fective condition was concededly established, it 
follows that defendant may not be relieved from 
the consequences of its neglect by the claim that 
plaintiff assumed the risk of such negligence. 
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"Rule 26, which was excluded from the evi-
dence, reads as follows: 'When emergency repair 
work is to be done under or about the cars in a 
train, and a blue signal is not available, the en-
gineman and fireman must be notified and protec-
tion must be given those engaged in making the 
repairs.' 
"In view of the amendment to section 54 
and of the Tiller decision rule 26 was immaterial 
to the issues and was properly rejected. Chicago, 
etc., Co. vs. Schendel, supra. If there was no as-
sumed risk or contributory negligence to be at-
tributed to the brakeman, no amount of rules 
adopted by defendant could alter the law if the 
company was itself negligent." 
In Aly v. Terminal R. Ass'n of St. Louis, 342 Mo. 
1116, 119 S.W. 2d 363, plaintiff's suit was founded upon 
the Boiler Inspection Act. He sought to mount a moving 
engine and when he stepped on the footboard it gave 
way, causing him to fall and lose both legs. The engine 
was coming toward him at the time he attempted to 
mount it. Defendant sought to introduce a rule of the 
company forbidding switchmen to board engines coming 
toward them. The trial court's refusal to admit the rule 
was upheld and the court stated: 
"Appellant offered to introduce in evidence 
a rule of the company which forbade switchmen 
to board engines coming toward them. The trial 
court refused to permit this rule to be introduced 
in evidence. Appellant has cited the case of Frese 
v. Chicago, B. & Q. R. Co., 263 U.S. 1, 44 S. Ct. 
1, 68 L. Ed. 131. In that case a statute of Illinois 
made it the duty of a locomotive engineer to stop 
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his train at a rrossing of another railroad and to 
positively ascertain that the way was clear before 
passing over the crossing. This the engineer failed 
to do and lost his life in a collision which followed. 
The court held that a violation of the statutory 
duty on the part of the engineer was the sole cause 
of the injury. "\Vithout deciding whether a viola-
tion of a rule of the company is a parity with a 
violation of a state statute, there is this distinc-
tion: In the Frese Case the plaintiff relied upon 
the negligence of the fireman in failing to perform 
a duty which the statute imposed upon the engi-
neer. In the case before us plaintiff was relying 
upon a defective appliance. So even if plaintiff 
violated a rule, that would be only a contributing 
cause and not the sole cause. In Spokane & I. E. 
R. Co. v. Campbell, 241 U.S. 497, 36 S. Ct. 683, 
60 L. Ed. 1125, the plaintiff had violated an order, 
and was injured through a defective air hose 
which caused a collision. In 241 U. S. 497, loc. cit. 
508, 36 S. Ct. 683, 689, 60 L. Ed. 1125, the Court 
said in speaking of the violations of the order : 
'In its legal effect this was nothing more than 
negligence on his part.' The court further said 
in the concluding part of the opinion: 'But where, 
as in this case, plaintiff's contributory negligence 
and defendant's violation of a provision of the 
safety appliance act are concurring proximate 
causes, it is plain that the employers' liability 
act requires the former to be disregarded.' In the 
case under consideration the jury was explicitly 
instructed that plaintiff could not recover unless 
the footboard slipped toward the drawbar and 
caused plaintiff to fall. A violation of the rule, 
therefore, could at most have been only contri-
butory negligence and not a defense. We must 
rule the point against appellant." 
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In Jordan v. East St. Louis Connecting Ry. Co., 308 
Mo. 31, 271 S.W. 997, plaintiff brought suit based upon 
a violation of the Coupler Section of the Safety Appli-
ance Act. Plaintiff kicked the drawbar in order to align 
it for coupling and his foot was crushed by the impact 
of the couplers. Defendant attempted fo introduce in 
evidence a rule of the defendant company prohibiting 
employees from kicking draw bars. The court stated: 
"The next error assigned is the refusal of the 
court to permit defendant to show that a rule 
had been promulgated forbidding employees to 
kick drawbars, and to show that the plaintiff had 
knowledge of the existence of that rule. Upon 
that Schendel vs. C. M. & St. P.R.R. Co. (Minn.), 
197 N. W. 744, and Kern v. Payne, Dir. Gen., 65 
Mont. 325, 211 P. 767, are cited. But it was held 
otherwise in Moore v. St. Joseph & G. I. Ry., 268 
Mo. 31, 186 S. W. 1035. In that case, one under the 
Safety Appliance Act, the question came up upon 
a rule forbidding employees 'to go between cars 
in motion to uncouple them.' Following reference 
to the circumstances under which the question 
arose, the court said, loc. cit. 35 (186 S. W. 1037): 
"'Further, respondent's violation, if any, of 
appellant's rule was at most but evidence of con-
tributory negligence; and in this case, the action 
being founded upon violations of the applicable 
Safety Appliance Act, contributory negligence 
constitutes neither defense nor mitigation. (Sec-
ond Employers' Liability Cases, 223, U.S. 1. c. 49, 
50.) There was no error in this ruling.' 
"In the first case cited by defendant, Schen-
del v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co., the question 
at issue was one of 'exact obedience from an em-
ployee to a foreman's direct command requiring 
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instant execution.' It was held that if the em-
ployee directly contrary to such command med-
dled with a defective appliance, his willful dis-
obedience must be regarded as the sole cause of 
his injury. But the court distinguished between 
a command of that sort and the issuance of gene-
ral standing orders or rules; the rule on the latter 
being that of the Supreme Court of the United 
States in Great Northern Ry. v. Otos, 239 U. S. 
349, 36 S. Ct. 12-l, 60 L. Ed. 322. This assignment 
n1ust be ruled against defendant." 
An analogous situation was presented in the case of 
Chicago Great Western R. Co. v. Schendel, 267 U.S. 287, 
-l-5 S. Ct. 303, 304, 69 L. Ed. 614. In that case plaintiff's 
decedent went between two cars to disengage a connect-
ing chain which had been temporarily placed there after 
a drawbar had been pulled out. He was injured when 
the car ran slowly down the grade. A rule of the com-
pany required that employees should advise the engineer 
when they were going between or under the cars. De-
cedent failed to do this although familiar with the rule. 
Defendant contended that the defective drawbar was not 
the proximate cause of the death and that the violation 
of the rule by the deceased constituted negligence sub-
sequent to and independent of the defective safety ap-
pliances and was the proximate cause of the injuries. 
These contentions of the defendant were held incorrect 
and the court stated: 
"The things shown to have been done by the 
deceased certainly amount to no more than con-
tributory negligence or assumption of the risk, 
and both of these are removed from consideration 
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old defense of contributory negligence to be a shield 
against liability under the name of sole proximate cause. 
The court therein stated : 
"'If, under the employers' liability act, plain-
tiff's negligence, contributing with defendant's 
negligence to the production of the injury, does 
not defeat the cause of action, but only lessens 
the damages, and if the cause of action is estab-
lished by showing that the injury resulted 'in 
whole or in part' from defendant's negligence, the 
statute would be nullified by calling plaintiff's 
act the proximate cause and then defeating him, 
when he could not be defeated by calling his act 
contributory negligence. For his act was the same 
act, by whatever name it be called. It is only when 
plaintiff's act is the sole cause-when the defend-
ant's act is no part of the causation-that defend-
ant is free from liability under the act.'" 
And also: 
"«' * * But having regard to the state of the 
proof as to the defect in the coupling mechanism, 
its failure to automatically work by impact after 
several efforts to bring about that result, all of 
which preceded the act of the switchman in going 
between the cars, in the view most favorable to 
the railroad, the case was one of concurring negli-
gence; that is, was one where the injury com-
plained of was caused both by the failure of the 
railway company to comply with the safety appli-
ance act and by the contributing negligence of the 
switch1nan in going between the cars. * * *" 
In Smiley v. St. Louis & S. F. Co., (Mo) 222 S.W. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
41 
2d -1S1 the court explained why a violation of a rule not 
to go between cars could only be contributory negligence. 
The plaintiff there Yiolated the rule and the court pointed 
out that his presence there was induced and made neces-
sary by the defective coupler. Except for the violation 
of the ~-\..ct plaintiff would not have been there and would 
not have been injured. 
In Scrimo v. Central R. R. of New Jersey, 138 F. 2d 
761, the defendant introduced in evidence a rule requir-
ing that cars, etc., be stopped before an attempt is made 
to adjust an inoperative coupling device. Plaintiff based 
his case on the coupler section of the Safety Appliance 
Act. The trial court instructed the jury that violation 
of the safety rules was not an issue in the case and the 
rules were not to be considered. The defendant excepted 
and requested an instruction that if the jury found that 
violation of the rule was the proximate cause of plain-
tiff's injury the verdict should be for defendant. The 
trial court was affirmed. 
See also Gulf C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Locher, (Tex) 264 
S.W. 595; McCarthy v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 156 F. 2d 
877 (cert. den. 329 U.S. 812); Otos v. Great Northern Ry. 
Co., 128 Minn. 283, 150 N.W. 922; Potter v. Los Angeles 
& 8. L. R. Co., 42 Nev. 370, 177 P. 933. 
It will be observed that in every case following mod-
ern day principles in which a coupling operation is in-
volved the violation of a rule not to go between the cars 
is considered merely contributory negligence and there-
fore the rule and its violation is not material in the case. 
'~.~ The only coupler case cited by the defendant is that of 
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!(ern v. Payne, 65 Mont. 325, 211 P. 767, decided in 1922. 
In that case there was no evidence that the couplers were 
closed or open and the court determined that in order for 
plaintiff to recover there must be indulged in his favor 
an inference upon an inference, which the court said was 
not permissible. From the quotation contained in defend-
ant's brief it appears that the court concluded that there 
was no necessity for the plaintiff to go between the cars. 
No such finding as matter of law can be made in the case 
at bar. 
The Suprmne Court of this State in Garay v. South-
ern Pac. Co., 223 P. 2d 819, in commenting upon cases 
involving the Coupler Act and rules prohibiting an em-
ployee from going in between the cars discusses some of 
the cases herein cited by plaintiff and refer to such cases 
as examples of concurring cause. 
The cases cited by the defendant on page 25 of its 
brief are cases which generally have been considered 
overruled by Tiller v. Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 318 
U.S. 54, 63 S. Ct. 444, 87 L. Ed. 610. In any event, those 
cases do not concern a violation of the Safety Appliance 
Act but in every instance are concerned with collisions 
of trains and special orders or violations of statute. 
vVhere cases involving Safety Appliance Act have arisen 
together with such orders, the courts have held that the 
violation of such orders are only contributory negligence. 
See Spokane & I. E. R. Co. v. Campbell, 241 U.S. 497, 36 
S. Ct. 683, 60 L. Ed. 1125. 
The Utah case of Wilson v. Union Pacific R. Co., 
231 P. 2d 715, is not comparable to the case at bar. The 
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violation of the rules here involved could be nothing more 
than a concurring or contributing cause of plaintiff's 
injuries. Plaintiff's presence between the cars was made 
necessary by the drawbar being out of alignment and no 
mechanism by which he could make the adjustment. His 
presence there could not be a sole or independent cause 
of his injuries separate and apart from the necessity 
which required him to be there. 
We submit that the evidence of safety rules and their 
violation was immaterial in this Safety Appliance Act 
case and that the trial court properly refused and re-
jected such testimony. 
CONCLUSION 
We respectfully submit that the evidence in this case 
supports the verdict and no error was committed in the 
giving of instructions and the rejecting of evidence. The 
judgment should be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
RAWLINGS, WALLACE, BLACK, 
ROBERTS & BLACK, 
Attorneys for Plaintiff and 
Respondent, 
530 Judge Building, 
Salt Lake City, Utah. 
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